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POINT I
APPELLANTS HAVE CURED THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT.
Defendant

claims,

and

plaintiffs

acknowledge,

that

the

judgment appealed from was not final under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Plaintiffs'

counsel

discovered

this

problem

while

preparing

plaintiffs' initial brief, and disclosed that Pro-Benefit Staffing,
Inc., had been made a party to the action and was served by
publication, and the case against Pro-Benefit remained pending at
the time the notice of appeal was filed.
At a hearing before the district court on August 2, 1993, the
court awarded a default judgment against Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc.
The formal judgment will be entered and filed with this Court in a
matter of days.

Upon entry of that judgment against Pro-Benefit,

the judgment against Intercare Benefit Systems becomes final, thus
curing the jurisdictional defect.
Defendant asserts the only proper remedy is to dismiss the
appeal without prejudice.

Plaintiffs request that this Court

reject the prior Utah decisions that would require such a result,
in favor of the approach adopted by the majority of the federal
courts.

Before 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit, like the Utah state courts, held that if an appeal
was mistakenly taken from a non-final judgment but the lack of
finality was cured during the appeal, dismissal was still required.
Then the en banc court reversed its prior position in favor of
saving time and resources by allowing a jurisdictional defect to be
cured.

Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1988).

Citing to cases from the D.C., 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th circuits, the
court noted:
Apparently all of the other circuits that have
considered this matter, however, have accepted
jurisdiction
in
analogous
circumstances,
notwithstanding a premature filing of a notice
of appeal. These circuits hold pre-Rule 54(b)
appeals in abeyance while the parties obtain
certification after the court's reminder of
the omission, treating the 54(b) certification
as relating nunc pro tunc to the date of the
notice of appeal or treating the notice of
appeal as ripening as of the date of the 54 (b)
certification.
850 F.2d at 643 (citations omitted).
Additional federal circuits have now adopted the same rule.
Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel Stores, Inc.. 924 F.2d 530 (4th
Cir. 1991); In re Chateaucray Corp. , 922 F.2d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 1990);
Martinez v. Arrow Truck Sales, Inc., 865 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1988).
The Kansas Supreme Court has also followed suit. Honeycutt v. City
of Wichita. 251 Kan. 451, 836 P.2d 1128, 1136 (1992).

2

A copy of the Lewis decision is attached for the Court's
reference.
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD REMAND TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS
TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT.
Before the trial court both parties and the court were
laboring under the mistaken understanding that if ERISA preemption
applied, the state court lacked

jurisdiction.

For example,

defendants counsel argued:
And if a claim relates to an employee benefit
plan, regardless of who asserts it, that claim
is preempted, and common-law causes of action
must be dismissed and the federal court has
got jurisdiction over that.
. . . .

. . . In any event, the case should be dismissed by this Court and Mr. Wolsey can look
at whatever remedies he has in the federal
court.
R. 256-257.
Although defendant has now correctly explained that the state
court has concurrent jurisdiction over ERISA claims for denial of
benefits, that is not the position defendant took below.

Had

plaintiffs been aware that the state court had concurrent jurisdiction, plaintiff would have sought leave to amend to assert the
ERISA claims in the state court. Where both parties were mistaken
as to the court7s jurisdiction, it is only fair that plaintiffs be
granted relief from that mistake.

3

The case should be remanded to

permit plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint to assert
claims under ERISA.
CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that because the judgment appealed from
is now final, the jurisdictional defect has been cured.

The Court

should then remand the case to permit plaintiffs to seek leave to
amend their complaint to assert claims under ERISA.
Alternatively, this Court should dismiss the appeal without
prejudice.
DATED this

^ ^

^ day of August, 1993.

JACKSON HOWARD,
FRED D. HOWARD, and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 2nd
day of August, 1993.
Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Strong & Harmi
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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such a process, the standard federal rule is
and has been that a landowner may testify
as to the market value of his own property.
It is only when his own testimony negates
the presumption that he has special knowledge of his property that a court is authorized to find such testimony alone insufficient to support a jury verdict in faVor of
the landowner. Sowards, 370 F.2d at 92.
Even in such cases the court cannot prevent the owner from testifying as to value,
although it can prevent the case from going to the jury.
Here, Sharp testified that his ranch property had unique characteristics which
where were well-suited to a cow/calf operation. He also testified that, as compared to
other ranches, its carrying capacity, when
combined with this suitability, increased
the ranch's value.
The district court, in the first trial properly permitted Sharp to testify as to the
value of the ranch. It also properly determined, after it had allowed Sharp to testify,
that Sharp's testimony, since it was based
on unacceptable methods of valuation, was
insufficient to support a jury verdict In
the second trial, however, the trial court
refused to allow Sharp to testify as to the
value of his property, even though Sharp
made it clear in his testimony that his
evaluation was not based on inherently impermissible methods.

nied, 456 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct 1971, 72 L.EA
2d 441 (1982). Hence, "[w]e are not prepared to say ... that the trial court would,
or could, have concluded that the evidence
in this case, once recognized as admissible,
was of insufficient probative force to sustain a jury verdict" LaCombe, 679 F.2d at
436. Nor can we conclude that the jury
would have rejected Sharp's testimony as
not credible. Id. The only other evidence
offered by Sharp Ranch which was admitted to establish the fair market value of the
ranch was the lay opinion testimony of
Gordon Scranton. We cannot say, after
reviewing the whole trial, that the testimony of Clifton Sharp would not have influenced the jury's award in this case. Because a property owner has the right to
testify as to the value of his property, and
because Mr. Sharp's rights in this regard
were denied, we hold that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant
Sharp Ranch a new trial*
Therefore, we AFFIRM the district
court's decision to grant the first new trial;
we REVERSE its decision to deny the second; and we REMAND for a new trial.

3>
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It might be argued that the error did not
affect Sharp's substantial rights if the
Robert LEWIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
court would have nonetheless determined
v.
that Sharp's testimony was insufficient eviBJ\ GOODRICH COMPANY; Daniel
dence on which a jury verdict might have
Newsome; Roy Ailstock,
rested* But we cannot reach that concluDefendants-Appellees.
sion here. Unlike his valuation in the first
trial, Sharp clearly indicated that he based
No. 87-1110.
his calculation of the value of his property
United States Court of Appeals,
on the sales prices of comparative properTenth Circuit
ties and not their offering price. The sales
price of "comparable property within a reaJuly 5, 1988.
sonable time before taking" is viewed as
the best evidence of fair market value in
this Circuit See Sowards, 370 F.2d at 89;
Plaintiff sued defendants for their alUnited States v. 77,819.10 Acres of Land, leged slander, and the United States Dis647 F.2d 104, 109 (10th Cir.1981), cert de- trict Court for the Western District of
& Because we find that the district court committed reversible error in so ruling, we do not

consider any other alleged errors raised by
Sharp Ranch.
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Oklahoma, Thomas R. Brett, J., entered
order summarily disposing of less than all
of claims. Plaintiff appealed. After plaintiff had filed notice of appeal, remaining
claims were subsequently dismissed. The
Court of Appeals, Logan, Circuit Judge,
held that premature notice of appeal from
order disposing of less than all of claims in.
case is nevertheless effective, where appellant obtains certification or final adjudication of matter before Court of Appeals
considers appeal on its merits.
So ordered.
Baldock, Circuit Judge, dissented and
filed opinion, in which Brorby, Circuit
Judge, joined

pany, Daniel Newsome, and Roy Ailstock
for slander in federal district court The
district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants by its order of
December 18, 1986, and plaintiff filed a
notice of appeal on January 16, 1987, challenging this judgment Hie issue before
this en banc court is whether we have
jurisdiction over the appeal. In deciding
this issue, we reassess our holding in A.O.
Smith Corp. v. Sims Consolidated, Ltd,
647 F.2d 118, 120-21 (10th Cir.1981).1

The grant of summary judgment here
was not an appealable final order because a
counterclaim by B.F. Goodrich against
Lewis remained unadjudicated when the
district court entered summary judgment
Responding to a motion which B.F. GoodFederal Courts *»668
rich had filed after the grant of summary
Premature notice of appeal from order judgment in the underlying cause, the disdisposing of le&& than all of claims ixv ca&e trict cotfft entered an order in \ate Decemis effective, where appellant obtains a certi- ber staying proceedings on the counterfication or a final adjudication of matter claim. The order was labeled an ''adminisbefore appeal is considered on its merits; trative closing order" and stated:
overruling Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167
'The Defendant B.F. Goodrich having
(10th Cir.); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Sims Conrequested the Court to stay its Countersolidated, Ltd., 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.);
claim in this cause of action, it is hereby
Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indusordered that the Clerk administratively
tries, Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir.). Fed.
terminate this action in his records, withRules Civ.Proc.Rule 54(b), 28 U.S.CJL;
out prejudice to the rights of the DefendF.R.A.P.Rule 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
ant B<F. Goodrich to reopen the proceedings for good cause shown for the entry
of any stipulation or order, or for any
Jim Brent Smalling, Chickasha, OkL, for
other purpose required to obtain a final
plaintiff-appellant
determination of the litigation.
C. William Threlkeld of Fenton, Fenton,
IF, within 60 days from the date herein
Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City,
[December 29, 1986], the Defendant B.F.
OkL, for defendants-appellees.
Goodrich has not reopened the proceedings
for the purpose of obtaining a final
Before HOLLOWAY, McKAY,
determination
herein, this action shall be
LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE,
deemed dismissed with prejudice.19
ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK and
Administrative Closing Order, Case No.
BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
CIV-86-1227-BT (W.D.Okla. December 29,
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
1986). B.F. Goodrich did not move to reIn this diversity action plaintiff Robert open the proceedings on its counterclaim
Lewis sued defendants B.F. Goodrich Com- within the sixty-day time period; thus the
1. Noting that many if not all of the circuit
courts which have considered the matter have
disagreed with our result in A.O. Smith, this
court sua sponte ordered en banc consideration
of the jurisdictional issue to decide whether we
should overrule A.O. Smith. After examining
the briefs and the appellate record, the court

determined unanimously that oral argument
would not materially assist the determination
and ordered the cause submitted without oral
argument. See Fed.&App.P. 34(a); 10th ClrJL
34.1.8(c) and 27.1.2. The parties were afforded
an opportunity for additional briefing before the
en banc court.
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closing order by its own terms matured
into a dismissal of the counterclaim with
prejudice on February 27, 1987, creating an
appealable final judgment for the entire
case.2
The fly in the ointment is that Lewis did
not file a timely notice of appeal after the
administrative closing order terminated the
entire litigation. Then, after receiving notice that we were considering dismissing
the appeal, Lewis and defendants applied to
the district court for certification of the
December 18 order as final under Fed.R.
Civ.P. 54(b). The district court granted the
request on May 13, 1987, but again no one
filed a notice of appeal after that certification.
If we follow the reasoning of A f t Smith
Corp., 647 F.2d at 120-21, and other cases
we have decided similarly, see, e.g., Lamp
v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir.1981);
Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Industries, Inc., 549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir.1977),
Lewis' premature notice of appeal was not
cured by the later final judgment Further, even if the Rule 54(b) certification,
acquired after the district court judgment
became final, was effective to resurrect the
right to appeal the December 18 order, the
failure to file a new notice of appeal thereafter would be fatal under Aft. Smith to
any claim that the certification saved the
appeal.
A f t Smith stated that this court would
dismiss appeals from interlocutory orders
when the district court had not given Rule
54(b) certification before the notice of appeal was filed, even if the district court
granted such certification subsequently
and before this court entered a dismissal
order. This rule was designed to benefit
2. Although the district court's "administrative
closing order" with respect to the counterclaim
is somewhat peculiar, we construe it as not
becoming a final judgment until the expiration
of the sixty days given BJr. Goodrich to reopen
its counterclaim.
In Schuurman v. Motor Vessel "Betty K V,
798 F.2d 442 (11th Cir.1986), the court faced an
analogous situation: the district court dismissed
plaintiffs complaint but granted plaintiff twenty
days from the date of the order to amend the
complaint. The Eleventh Circuit established the
following rule for this situation:

the appellate court, which no longer would
have to hold the case in administrative limbo while the appellant either returned to
the district court to seek a Rule 54(b) certification or awaited the termination of the
entire case.
In A.O. Smith, the premature appeal
was filed while the case was ongoing in
the district court Thus, this court thought
that the appellant could either await the
end of the entire litigation in district court
and then file a notice of appeal, or seek and
obtain Rule 54(b) certification after which
it could file a new notice of appeal. We
thus formulated the rule in AO. Smith in
anticipation that the rule would seldom result in a loss of appellate review for a
disappointed litigant 'This is not a situation in which a procedural technicality forever forecloses the appellant from having
an appellate court consider the merits of
the case." Id at 121.
Apparently all of the other circuits that
have considered this matter, however, have
accepted jurisdiction in analogous circumstances, notwithstanding a premature filing of a notice of appeal. These circuits
hold pre-Rule 54(b) appeals in abeyance
while the parties obtain certification after
the court's reminder of the omission, treating the 54(b) certification as relating nunc
pro tunc to the date of the notice of appeal
or treating the notice of appeal as ripening
as of the date of the 54(b) certification.
See Tidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 824 F.2d 84,
85-87 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam); Coalition for Equitable Minority Participation
in Architectural Contracts in Tennessee
(COMPACT) v. Metropolitan Government
of Nashville and Davidson County, 786
"If the plaintiff does not amend the complaint
within the time allowed, no amendment may
be made absent leave of court, and the dismissal order becomes final at the end of the
stated period. For appeal purposes, we hold
that the order of dismissal in this situation
becomes final upon the expiration of the time
allowed for amendment The time for appeal
is measured from the date on which the district court order of dismissal becomes final."
Id. at 445.
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F.2d 227, 228 & n. 1 (6th Cir.1986); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d
177, 180-81 (7th Cir.1985); Metallurgical
Industries, Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 771 F.2d
915, 916 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam); Freeman v. Hittle, 747 F.2d 1299, 1301-02 (9th
Cir.1984); Hayden v. McDonald, 719 F.2d
266, 268 (8th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (taking
jurisdiction of appeal before determining
that Rule 54(b) certification had been improvidently granted); Tilden Financial
Corp. v. Palo Tire Service, Inc., 596 F.2d
604, 606-07 (3d Cir.1979). But cf. Oak
Construction Co. v. Huron Cement Co.,
475 F.2d 1220, 1221 (6th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (no 54(b) certification was entered
before appellate court's decision; "[t]his
lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured now by
a belated Rule 54(b) certification").
The circuits that take a more forgiving
attitude toward premature notices of appeal state varying reasons to reject our
A f t Smith approach. The Ninth Circuit,
in Freeman v. Hittle, 747 F.2d 1299 (9th
Cir.1984), takes direct issue with A f t
Smith's assertion that dismissing premature notices of appeal would prevent administrative complications:
'The concern of the Tenth Circuit was
that allowing appeals where the appellant had not secured a 54(b) certification
would lead to a large number of cases
being held in a pending category and to
confusion and delay. [Aft Smith, 647
F.2d] at 121. We respectfully disagree.
The procedure would not be unduly complicated If a 54(b) certification had been
entered since the notice of appeal, as
here, the case would be properly before
the reviewing court; if 54(b) certification
had not been entered, the appeal would
be dismissed as a nonfinal judgment"
Id. at 1301-02. The Seventh Circuit takes
the position that dismissal of premature
notices of appeal actually would increase
administrative burdens on courts and litigants: "[D]ismissal of the appeal due to
the belated certification would be 'empty
paper shuffling1 because the same papers
would likely be before the court in a matter
of months after appellants went through
'the empty formality of obtaining another

certification and filing another notice of
appeal.'" Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir.1985)
(quoting Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1074 (7th
Cir.1981)).
Strictly speaking, precedent in this circuit does not require dismissal of this appeal The A f t Smith opinion did not cite
or expressly overrule Morris v. Uhl & Lapez Engineers, Inc., 442 F.2d 1247 (10th
Cir.1971), in which we took a more charitable approach to a premature notice of appeal. The facts of Morris closely parallel
the instant case. The appellant there filed
a notice of appeal without obtaining Rule
54(b) certification; the entire case was concluded by the district court by the time the
original appeal reached the panel's attention, but appellant had failed to file a new
notice of appeal As in the instant case, a
hard-line rule would have denied appellant
any appeal at any time. Rejecting this
approach, we wrote:
"In our view, the notice of appeal had
capacity in the circumstances to provide
jurisdictional basis that would entitle this
Court to refuse, as it did, to make dismissal of the appeal out-of-hand and to allow
the notice to ripen into full effectiveness
as to the rendered judgment, since it
seemed apparent that the judgment
would remain unchanged in its form and
content; that its lack of technical formal
finality would become dispelled in natural course and within a not undue period
of time; and that no prejudice could result to any one from so dealing: withthe^
notice."
442 F.2d at 1250. See also Frankfort Oil
Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 438-39 (10th
Cir.) (allowing appeal in similar circumstances), cert denied, 364 U.S. 920, 81
S.Ct 283, 5 LEA2d 59 (1960).
Morris and A f t Smith are not irreconcilable. In Morris, the appeal would have
been lost but for the court's lenity. AO.
Smith, in contrast, did not present an appellant which would lose entirely its right
to appeal if the panel ruled against it
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645

Cite as 850 ¥2d 641 (10th Cir. 1988)

Thus, perhaps the two cases can coexist in
this circuit on this basis; but there is no
doubt great tension exists between their
different approaches.
Jurisdictional problems under the A.O.
Smith rationale have arisen too frequently
in this circuit since that decision. In a
typical scenario, counsel, after belatedly
recognizing the lack of a Rule 54(b) certification, would secure such a certification
from the district court but would fail to file
a new notice of appeal. Because the appealed order was final and certified for
appeal under Rule 54(b), failure to file a
new notice foreclosed the appeal unless the
court was willing to interpret the words
"final order" in Rule 54(b) and in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 as having different meanings. See
Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 835
F.2d 245, 247 n. 2 (10th Cir.1987). In other
cases no Rule 54(b) certification would ever
be obtained, but before this court alerted
the parties to the jurisdictional defect, the
district court would have terminated the
entire litigation by adjudicating the other
claims. The losing parties, thinking they
already had a viable appeal raising the
issues that concerned them, would fail to
file a new notice of appeal. Thus, the
requirement that a new notice of appeal be
filed after a belated Rule 54(b) certification
or after disposition of all other claims often
proved a trap for unwary attorneys. Further, the rule of A.O. Smith caused this
court to expend undue judicial resources
untangling situations such as the "administrative closing order" in the case before us.
Because of these problems we now overrule A.O. Smith, Lamp, Golden Villa Spa,
and any other cases to the same effect, and
we reaffirm Morris, with the refinements
hereafter noted
In the situation like that before us, in
which the other claims were effectively dismissed after the notice of appeal was filed,
we believe Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(2) permits the
interpretation that the notice of appeal,
filed prematurely, ripens and saves the appeal. Accord Cape May Greene, Inc. v.
Warren, 698 F.2d 179,184-85 (3d Cir.1983);
see also Finn v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 585 (11th Cir.1987)
(allowing appeal without express reliance
850F.2t*-16

upon Fed.R.App.P. 4(aX2)); Gillis v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 759 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir.
1985) (same); Pireno v. New York State
Chiropractic Association, 650 F.2d 387,
389-90 n. 4 (2d Cir.1981) (same), affd sub
nom. Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 102 S.Ct 3002, 73
L.Ed.2d 647 (1982); Anderson v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 630 F.2d 677, 680-81 (9th
Cir. 1980) (same); Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231
(5th Cir. 1973) (same). In analogous situations, the Supreme Court has allowed subsequent events to validate prematurely
filed appeals. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct 227, 229-30,
9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Lemke v. United
States, 346 U.S. 325, 326, 74 S.Ct 1, 1, 98
L.Ed. 3 (1953) (criminal appeal). Thus,
when a district court has adjudicated all
remaining outstanding claims before this
appellate court acts to dismiss the appeal,
we will consider the appeal on its merits
rather than dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
whether or not a party in the meantime has
obtained a Rule 54(b) certification. In such
cases generally we will consolidate or companion the earlier appeal with any subsequent appeals arising out of the same district court case.
When the district court case is still ongoing at the time the appeal reaches this
court's attention, two possibilities arise.
One is that a belated Rule 54(b) certification has been obtained. In this situation, if
the appellant obtains a 54(b) certification
after the notice of appeal was filed, we will
deem the notice of appeal to ripen as of the
date of certification and will accept the
jurisdiction pursuant to the savings provision of Fed.RApp.P. 4(a)(2). The other
possibility is that no Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification has been obtained. For this, we
hereby adopt the practice of notifying the
parties of our observation of the apparent
jurisdictional defect and giving them a date
certain by which to secure Rule 54(b) certification or an order or judgment explicitly
adjudicating all remaining claims. If no
certification, or final, dispositive adjudication, is obtained and presented to this ap-
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pellate court by the specified date, the case
will be dismissed summarily for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.
Having determined that we have jurisdiction in the instant case, we order the appeal
placed on the regular calendar. Briefs are
to be filed according to the schedule set out
in 10th Cir.R. 31 measured from the date
this opinion is entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, with
whom BRORBY, Circuit Judge, joins,
dissenting.
The majority holds that a premature notice of appeal is effective if a subsequent
Fe&R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification is obtained
or if a final adjudication of the matter
occurs before the court considers the merits of the appeal. I respectfully disagree
with this procedure for two reasons. First,
I do not think that the court of appeals has
the power to expand appellate jurisdiction
through reinterpretation of settled law.
Second, even assuming the new procedure
is more efficient, I question the need to
provide a failsafe system for preserving a
civil appeal due to the ease of compliance
with the established rules.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that "The
courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . .
except where a direct review may be had in
the Supreme Court" In the situation before us, there is little mystery as to what
constitutes a final decision. A final decision under § 1291 is one which " 'ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute on the
judgment'"
Gulfstream
Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., — U.S.
,
108 S.Ct 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988)
1. FedJLCivJ\ 54 provides:
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than
one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than ail of the claims or the parties only upon
an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express di-

(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.
229, 233, 65 S.Ct 631, 633, 89 L.EA 911
(1945)). In the absence of a final judgment
on all claims or a final judgment on part of
the claims, Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) makes it
clear that 1) there can be no final decision
which terminates the action, and 2) any
previous decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of a final judgment adjudicating all claims.1 Although
the collateral-order doctrine provides an exception to the final-decision rule contained
in § 1291, the doctrine is without application in this case. See Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47,
69 S.Ct 1221,1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)
(collateral-order doctrine stated); Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468,
98 S.Ct 2454, 2457, 57 LEd.2d 351 (1978)
(requirements for application of collateralorder doctrine). Instead, we are presented
with a notice of appeal filed before the
district court adjudicated all the claims in
the action and before a Rule 54(b) certification was obtained.
Under our prior decisions, this appeal
would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appellate jurisdiction would be determined
as of the date the notice of appeal was filed
(January 16, 1987), and a later Rule 54(b)
certification by the district court would be
ineffective. Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d
1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1981); A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Sims ConsoL, Ltd., 647 P.2d 118,
120 (10th Cir.1981). Although summary
judgment in favor of defendants was entered on the main claim on December 18,
1986, that judgment failed to adjudicate all
the claims of the parties. It was not a finaL
judgment Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The nextorder entered on December 31, 1987, the
administrative closing order staying the derection for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of the parties.
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fendant's counterclaim, left defendant
Goodrich the option of reopening the action
within sixty days. The administrative closing order indicates that the district court
never intended its summary judgment order to be a final order. The counterclaim
was pending at the time the notice of appeal was filed, January 16, 1987, and the
summary judgment entered by the district
court could have been revised. Golden
Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549
F.2d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir.1977); Fed.R.
Civ.P. 54(b). Accordingly, the notice of
appeal was premature and ineffective.
The majority concludes that the premature notice of appeal became effective
when the administrative closing order "matured into a dismissal of the counterclaim
with prejudice" and thereby created an appealable final judgment Majority Opinion
at 643. The majority claims to find support
for its new rule in FecLR.App.P. 4(aX2),
which provides:
Except as provided in (aX4) of this
Rule 4, a notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a decision or order but
before entry of the judgment or order
shall be treated as filed after such entry
and on the day thereof.
Fed.R.App.P. 4(aX4), referred to in Rule
4(aX2), clarifies that a notice of appeal filed
prior to the disposition of a post-trial motion is ineffective and that a new notice of
appeal must be filed after the disposition of
the motion. By its terms, Rule 4(aX2) applies when a party appeals "after the announcement of a decision or order but before entry oi the judgment or order/' "It
applies, therefore, only to a decision that
will be final on its entry. It does not make
appealable an order that is not appealable
under § 1291 or § 1292(a)." 9 J. Moore, B.
Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice
11204.14 (1987). Thus, Rule 4(aX2) hardly
applies in these circumstances because the
original summary judgment was not an
appealable order. Moreover, the appellate
rules are not to be construed so as to
expand the court's jurisdiction. FedJt.
App.P. 1(b).

The majority also relies on other cases
which have reached a similar result The
most persuasive reason advanced for this
result is that the Supreme Court has indicated that there must be a practical rather
than technical approach to finality under
§ 1291, one which balances the harms of
piecemeal review against justice denied by
delay. Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct 308, 311,
13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964); Cohen, 337 U.S. at
546, 69 S.Ct at 1225. I cannot agree,
however, that "[f]n analagous situations,
the Supreme Court has allowed subsequent
events to validate prematurely filed appeals. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct 227, 229-30, 9 L.Ed.2d
222 (1962); Lemke v. United States, 346
U.S. 325, 326, 74 S.Ct 1, 98 L.Ed. 3 (1953)
(criminal appeal)." Majority Opinion at
645.2 These brief cases simply do not turn
on an attempt to appeal solely from a judgment which could not be final upon entry.
Because I view the majority's decision as
conflicting with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), I am
not persuaded that the general Supreme
Court authority mentioned by the majority
is adequate support for the result achieved
here.
There is another reason why I cannot
agree with the new procedure announced
by the majority. Perfecting an appeal is
not a difficult task and it should be entrusted to those appearing before the court
rather than to the court itself. The following best expresses this sentiment
The rules of appellate practice in hand
are simple and plain. They fill no office
of mere red tape, or as a show of surface
routine. To the contrary, they have substance, and carry on their face the obvious purpose to aid appellate courts in
getting at the right of a cause. Hence,
apparently, they bespeak the dignity arising from obedience. If they are not to
be obeyed, they should be done away
with once and for all. A just rule, fairly
interpreted and enforced, wrongs no
man. Ostensibly enforced, but not, it

2. See also Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 V2& appeal."). This proposition is also supported by
6T7t 681 (9th Cir.1980) ("Analogously, subsecitations to Foman and Lemke.
quent events can validate a prematurely filed
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necessarily wrongs some men viz., those
who labor to obey it—the very ones it
should not injure.
Sullivan v. Holbrook, 109 S.W. 668, 670
(Mo. 1908) (Lamm, J.). After our initial reminder that the appeal was jurisdictionally
defective, appellants obtained a Rule 54(b)
certification from the district court but did
not file another notice of appeal. In light of
what was settled Tenth Circuit law at the
time, the failure to file a timely notice of
appeal was hardly prudent In the long
run, and in fairness to those who do follow
the simple appellate rules, the court's time
is better spent resolving correctly filed appeals rather than shepherding stray appeals
back into the flock.
I would dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.

Infants <*=>204
Date of district court's order which
formally adjudged juvenile delinquent, not
date on which juvenile was arraigned by
magistrate and agreed to admit to violation, triggered 20-day time clock of statute
requiring disposition hearing within 20
days after juvenile delinquency hearing;
20-day rule was not violated because sentencing occurred on same date as adjudication of delinquency. 18 UJ3.CA. § 5037.

Ann Steinmetz, Asst Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, N.M., for defendantappellant
Mark Jarmie, Asst U.S. Atty., (William
L. Lutz, U.S. Atty., and David N. Williams,
Asst U.S. Atty., with him on the brief),
Albuquerque, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McKAY, BARRETT and
TACHA, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Circuit Judge.

UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee*
v.
STEVEN W. (a Juvenile),
Defendant-Appellant*
No. 87-1781.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
July 5, 1988.
Juvenfle was adjudged delinquent by
the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico, Juan G. Burciaga,
J., and juvenile appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Tacha, Circuit Judge, held that
date of order formally adjudicating juvenile
as delinquent, not date on which juvenile
was arraigned by magistrate and agreed to
admit to violation, triggered 20-day time
clock of statute requiring disposition hearing within 20 days of juvenile delinquency
hearing.
Affirmed.

Defendant Steven W. (a juvenile) was
charged on February 13, 1987, with violating the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037, by committing the
offense of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm. He was
arraigned on March 20,1987, before a United States Magistrate and agreed to admit
to the violation. On May 15, 1987, the
defendant appeared before the United
States District Court which found him to be
a juvenile delinquent and placed him on
probation for six months.
The afternoon before his hearing in the
district court, the defendant asked the
court to dismiss the charge against him
because of an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 5037. The court denied the motion, and
defendant appeals.
The relevant portion of section 5037 in
effect at the time, provided:
If the court finds a juvenile to be a
juvenile delinquent, the court shall hold a
disposition hearing concerning the appro*
priate disposition no later than twenty

